CBDCs, Financial Inclusion, and Optimal Monetary Policy
  • David Murakami
  • , Ivan Shchapov
  • and Ganesh Viswanath-Natraj
- Documents de travail
In this paper we study the interaction between monetary policy and financial inclusion in an economy that introduces a central bank digital currency (CBDC). Using a New Keynesian two-agent framework with banked and unbanked households, we show that CBDCs provide a more efficient savings device for the unbanked to smooth consumption, increasing welfare. A Ramsey optimal policy exercise reveals that the CBDC rate is set at a constant spread to the policy rate. We observe a policy trade-off: a higher CBDC rate benefits the unbanked, but disintermediates banks and reduces welfare of banked households. Taken together, our findings highlight the role of tailoring CBDC design based on the level of financial inclusion in an economy.
Nos partenaires
Institut Louis Bachelier - Fondation du risque
Cartes Bancaires CB
Caisse des Dépôts
Institut National de la Statistique et des Etudes Economiques
Avec le soutien de
Autorité de Contrôle Prudentiel et de Résolution